


# TIG *Brief*

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1996

## SPECIAL ISSUE CYBER CRIME





*Dedicated to improving the Air Force*

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In the last *TIG Brief*, the electronic mail addresses for all Air Force Inspection Agency Directors were provided on our back cover. As of print time, all directors held an *smtp* gateway for their electronic mail. Our agency has since changed electronic mail systems and our E-mail addresses have subsequently changed. Therefore, the correct gateway designation is *smtps*, and the complete address for all members of the Air Force Inspection Agency is *userid@smtps.saia.af.mil*. Correspondence and manuscripts submitted to *TIG Brief* should also be addressed to the *smtps* gateway at the following address: *tig@smtps.af.mil*. While E-mail addresses to the old gateway will temporarily be forwarded to the *smtps* gateway, please make a note of the change for future correspondence. We apologize for any confusion this may have caused.


This issue focuses on the role the Air Force Office of Special Investigations plays in the mission of protecting our country and our

people. Because of this special theme, the Investigator's Dossiers department will not appear in this issue. Instead of the usual synopses, we have interesting feature articles on force protection and technology that AFOSI is or will be using to continue protecting Air Force people and assets. Brig. Gen. Francis Taylor, AFOSI's new commander, provides the signature article for this special issue.

*TIG Brief* is the inspector general magazine for Air Force leaders at every level. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald Fogleman stated that a leader is anyone who makes things happen. As a leader, it is *your* responsibility to remain informed about current Air Force issues that affect your people and the way you carry out your mission. Inspector general issues definitely fall into both categories. If you are not

receiving *TIG Brief* through your publishing distribution office, all you need do is contact them to be placed on distribution. *TIG Brief* is also available to our readers via the Internet at [www-afia.saia.af.mil](http://www-afia.saia.af.mil). If you need to change your paper requirements for the magazine because of your Internet access, you may also work through your local publishing distribution office.

*TIG Brief* solicits manuscripts from military members, active duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilians of all ranks on myriad articles relating to inspectors general activities. E-mail your manuscripts to [tig@smtps.saia.af.mil](mailto:tig@smtps.saia.af.mil).

  
ANGELA L. HICKS  
Captain, USAF

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# AFOSI's Golden Legacy and Boundless Future

by Brig. Gen. Francis X. Taylor



**A**s our Air Force prepares to celebrate its 50 years of a “golden legacy” and focuses on its “boundless future,” let me take this opportunity to tell you about the vital role the Air Force Office of Special Investigations has played in the Air Force of the past and how we plan to continue protecting the Air Force of the future.

With the establishment of the AFOSI on Aug. 1, 1948, the Air Force became the first service to combine criminal and counterintelligence investigative authority under a single agency, independent of improper command influence. Since that time, AFOSI's basic mission of investigating crimes against people and property and countering intelligence threats has, for the most part, remained unchanged. However, in response to ever-changing missions and environments encountered by our Air Force, AFOSI has continually adapted its capability to aggressively respond to Air Force and Department of Defense needs for our service.

AFOSI's history provides many examples of significant contributions we've made to various Air Force peacetime and wartime roles and missions. It was the AFOSI commander in Korea who called General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo to give the first report of the June 25, 1950 North Korean invasion and, at the onset of U.S. involvement in that war, we were

a principal collector and provider of key information to Air Force operational forces. In the 1950s and 1960s when General Curtis LeMay wanted to test the security of Strategic Air Command bases and assets, he turned to AFOSI to devise vulnerability tests that resulted in enhanced security. Even unidentified flying objects were once a focus for AFOSI examination. Until Project Blue Book ended in the 1970s, we were the agency tasked to investigate reports of alleged unidentified flying object sightings. We were also in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s gathering early warning threat information in support of air base defense against surprise attack and sabotage. With the rise of international terrorism on the world stage in the 1970s, we responded with new investigative tools and programs of instruction to enhance the protection of Air Force people and resources from acts of terrorism. Since the 1980s, our people have served in every Air Force contingency from Grenada to Panama and from Somalia to Bosnia.

Today the men and women of AFOSI are actively engaged in developing the capabilities needed to effectively counter threats and address challenges the Air Force will face in the next century. Experience teaches that the “boundless future” requires us to remain flexible, be responsive to dynamic situations, and always look

forward. The bottom line for us is that for the Air Force to carry out its vision of "Global Reach, Global Power," AFOSI must continually be aware of future trends in order to stay ahead of those whose intentions are inimical to our nation's security.

As you'll read in one of the following articles, a growing area of concern is the potential exploitation of computer-based information. The Air Force uses computers to store both routine and highly sensitive information, and almost every modern weapon system incorporates computers into its operation. As our dependence on these systems to communicate and put bombs on target grows, so too does the need to protect this vital capability and prevent the compromise or destruction of data stored on our systems.

Traditional violent crimes continue to keep us busy. Homicide, rape, and terrorism have been around a long time and unfortunately are not likely to go away. In another feature article, you'll read about how we have aggressively embraced new technology, such as digital cameras and computer sketch programs to assist us in neutralizing these crimes. The use of this technology saves precious time and manpower so we can turn our attention to other Air

Force priorities as well.

Force protection in an era of terrorism is a major concern of the Air Force and Department of Defense. In order to fly, fight, and win, it is imperative that AFOSI continue to provide fully integrated support to force protection efforts. Contingencies and nontraditional warfighting and peacekeeping roles and missions have become a way of life in the new Air Force and AFOSI has adapted and changed to meet these challenges. We've aligned ourselves functionally with major commands instead of geographically and are now integrated into the status of resources and training system programs of those commands. We pride ourselves in being responsive to the needs and missions of the commanders we serve and when a deployment occurs, major command commanders in chief have said they want our agents on the first airplane into the trouble spot.

Our involvement in contingencies such as Somalia, Haiti, Southwest Asia, and Bosnia has proven complex and dangerous operations are no longer the purview of a single service. Therefore, AFOSI has integrated its counterintelligence and antiterrorism expertise with that of other defense intelligence counterparts to ensure

combatant, component, and field commanders receive the highest quality and most timely information possible in support of their respective missions.

History dictates that we must prepare now to meet the threats we'll face in the future. Researching and employing advanced technology and training are the means which make it possible for us to do just that. They are the force multipliers enabling the men and women of AFOSI to execute their special investigative and counterintelligence missions and counter those who threaten the safety and security of our people and systems. The next few pages provide a glimpse of what AFOSI is doing in the areas of technology, computers, and force protection to safeguard Air Force resources now and in the future and how we will continue to remain an integral part of the Air Force team. ♦

*Francis X. Fayle*  
Commander, Air Force Office  
of Special Investigations



# Future Technology

**Lt. Col. Chris Orendorff**  
**HQ AFOSI/XOR DSN 297-7055**

**T**he Air Force Office of Special Investigations has the responsibility to anticipate future investigative needs for the United States Air Force. This forward thinking ensures AFOSI is capable of meeting new challenges in criminal, fraud and counterintelligence investigations, as well as special agent training. For centuries the challenge of law enforcement remained relatively unchanged—to anticipate when a crime might occur and then to identify and find the culprits who committed the crime. Today, the criminal element, like society as a whole, is limited only by its imagination. Just as technology changes our personal lives, it also presents opportunities for criminals and new, often unexpected, challenges for law enforcement agencies. The recent movie *Virtuosity*, illustrates this point. In the film, Denzel Washington portrays a 21st century cop tracking down a criminal literally born in cyber space. While AFOSI special agents do not face adversaries as “high tech” as the one portrayed in this movie, they do confront challenges that can seem as formidable. A lesson for law enforcement agencies is as technological capability expands, the criminal element quickly finds ways to exploit that advantage.

Prime examples of the lawless exploitation of technology are computer hackers’ use of the Internet to break into various systems and others using the Internet to spread child pornography. These are only two examples of AFOSI’s chal-

lenge. We’ve been able to anticipate such high technology violations and know how to investigate various types of crimes when they occur. That’s because our requirements process is linked to the right people to ensure our investigative needs. These experts staff AFOSI’s requirements division, which leads the way in seeking out and using this new technology to our own advantage, ensuring a competitive edge against criminals.

Only a few years ago, one of the significant challenges associated with criminal investigations was developing logical links among multiple subjects of investigation. Agents would typically accomplish this on a chalkboard during a brainstorming session. Today, the requirements division is testing software capable of developing those links and highlighting logical connections that were not obvious before. Building correlations among people, places, and events based on interviews, surveillances, documents, and any other data indicates link analysis software will prove to be a vital tool leading to greater investigative depth. Moreover, the added capability to cross link with other offices and investigative agencies will greatly enhance our investigative resources.

Similar to link analysis, imaging software holds significant promise for fraud investigations. By using the ability to scan case documents into a database and querying for specific information, agents will be able to quickly

identify and locate key documents, the “smoking gun” if you will. This technology, using powerful search engines, can in seconds locate and analyze the needed documents or information thus enabling a single agent to accomplish the same tasks that might have required the use of several agents in the past. Imaging software, while particularly promising in fraud investigations in which hundreds of thousands of documents may be involved, also holds promise for other types of criminal investigations where document searches are necessary.

Another computer-based technology that enables agents to more quickly identify and apprehend subjects is facial imaging software in which composite sketches can be developed quickly and accurately. In the past, putting together a composite sketch was time consuming and produced an end product that in some cases was mere caricature at best. However, by using computer-based facial imaging software the process is faster and produces more lifelike composites, increasing the likelihood of identifying a suspected offender. Identifying persons engaged in illicit activities is also enhanced by the use of digital camera equipment.

Using state-of-the-art digital cameras and accompanying software, agents can take highly detailed photographs of subjects, landmarks, and crime scenes during an investigation. These photographs can be digitally produced with a computer and color printer eliminating the need for wet photography and thereby protecting the environment from pollutants associated with traditional film development. Furthermore, agents will have the capability to securely send the digital photos to other special investigation offices anywhere in the world via the Internet, making information sharing among various geographic areas more timely. This technology is especially useful in AFOSI’s counterintelligence and force protection support roles.

As impressive as these technologies are, the

most important element of AFOSI remains the people who make up the command. The requirements division is working hard to improve the quality of training through the use of some of the newest technology. One advanced training aid is the firearms training system. This equipment is useful for training agents in realistic “shoot, don’t shoot” scenarios in which there are more options for training. These options have to do with the trainer’s ability to direct the scenario based on the student’s reaction. With this capability, the firearms training system will result in better trained agents who are more comfortable and competent to make the toughest decisions in the performance of their duties.

The competence of new and seasoned agents will be further enhanced through the use of virtual reality. While the use of this technology is still on the horizon, it holds promise as a valuable training tool. In the future, agent trainees will be able to learn much in processing crime scenes and in conducting investigations in which trainers will have more latitude in developing different scenarios and scenes. This kind of training will add significant depth and breadth to agents’ experience and skill.

The systems mentioned above are only a small sampling of the equipment the AFOSI requirements division is testing and fielding. The real test of the office’s effectiveness is not whether it delivers “high tech” gadgetry to the field but whether or not the systems help agents better serve the Air Force. In this regard, significant research and testing goes into the selection and purchase of new investigative tools. In order for a new instrument to be useful, it must be compatible with existing resources, user friendly, cost effective, and accomplish exactly what the agents need it to do—protect Air Force resources. It is with this mission in mind the AFOSI requirements division forges ahead toward the goal of providing investigators the tools they need. ♦

# READINESS AND FORCE PROTECTION

Lt. Col. Thomas P. Coyne  
HQ AFOSI/XOX DSN 297-6992



**“When people are under a clear and direct threat, the Air Force will protect them.”**

—Air Force Policy Directive 71-1,  
*Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence*

Force protection and force projection go hand in hand. The Air Force Office of Special Investigation’s traditional mission is to secure Air Force resources and personnel by conducting criminal investigations and counterintelligence operations. Because Air Force people are stationed in locations as diverse as Anchorage, Alaska and Zagreb, Hungary, AFOSI must be in place or ready to go wherever Air Force people are. Over the years, the men and women of AFOSI have maintained vigilance during the evolution of the B-26 into today’s B-2s and post-World War II airmen in “pinks and tans” to battle dress uniforms in Bosnia. Air Force troops arriving in Korea in 1950 were met by AFOSI agents with the “straight scoop” on the local threat. In 1996, Air Force personnel going in harms way will find an agent in place with the latest information on ways to stay alive while getting the job done.

AFOSI has more than 35 people assigned to support deployed units engaged in contingency operations, 456 assigned overseas, and 21 more supporting joint chief of staff exercises. With a total force of 1,300 agents and an ongoing commitment to provide quality investigative support in more than 140 locations, a substantial commitment to readiness and training is required. Being in place and ready to do the job anywhere and anytime is an office of special investigation tradition. AFOSI, the only Air Force organization authorized to conduct counterintelligence activities, is responsible for providing commanders with information concerning threats to Air Force personnel and

U.S. Air Force Photo



resources. The techniques used to determine that threat are the product of years of training and experience and draw heavily upon our organizational history.

One of AFOSI's first big counterintelligence successes was its ability to provide the date and time of the North Korean invasion weeks before the first attack that marked the beginning of the Korean War. Flexibility and initiative have always been the keys to successful operations within special investigation. Few, if any, have been more resourceful than Donald Nichols, assigned with a small cadre of AFOSI agents and local national employees to support Far East Air Forces in Korea in 1950. With few Air Force personnel on the ground as North Korean forces rolled into Seoul, Nichols' unit quickly became the chief providers of information. Nichols identified targets to be destroyed in the Seoul area, assisted in the evacuation of U.S. personnel while under fire, and returned to enemy-held territory to destroy an F-86, B-26, and other U.S. aircraft at the airfield.

In Vietnam, Iran, Turkey, and the Philippines, to name a few, agents collected information which frustrated the activities of terrorists, insurgents, and criminals targeting Air Force people and property. In a letter to his headquarters, the leader of a New Peoples Army assassination unit outside Clark Air Base in the Philippines blamed AFOSI for his lack of success. Today, agents and AFOSI support personnel are in place with Air Force, NATO, and United Nations forces supporting operations in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the former Yugoslavia. AFOSI provides the supported commander with a unique link to host-nation police, security services, and the local population "outside the wire." Agents are skilled in liaison with host nation counterparts. Common experience, based on shared law enforcement roles, is often the basis for long and productive relationships between AFOSI and the host-nation police officials. Local police are usually the best source of information on threats to U.S. forces. By working together with host country officials, agents obtain the information necessary for the

deployed commander to plan a force-protection strategy which meets safety and mission needs. In addition, agents bring a "bad guy" perspective to vulnerability assessments and antiterrorism services. AFOSI collects information on the history, capabilities, and intent of forces hostile to Air Force interests in all deployed areas to determine the threat. Agents use this information to search for exploitable vulnerabilities in facilities and also in the travel or recreational habits of Air Force personnel. This information is provided to the local Air Force commander who uses it as the foundation of his force protection package. Teamwork is the key to successful force protection.

Teamwork is also necessary to be able to deploy well-trained and mission-capable agents and support personnel to overseas units and deployed locations. People in mobility processing lines are often surprised to find that the no rank "slick sleeve" individual wears a special agent tape over his or her name on their battle dress uniform. They shouldn't be. AFOSI has over 1,000 deployable personnel committed to a wide range of executable operations plans. In addition to maintaining a high degree of proficiency in unique investigative skills, AFOSI people meet the same training requirements as other deployable personnel. Special training in languages, counterintelligence, force protection, and local area customs and history also prepare agents to provide the best possible service.

Agents often deploy before or with the advance echelon team going to distant locations like Operation Support Hope in Rwanda in 1994. The objective is for the agent on the ground to be able to provide the deployed commander an assessment of the local threat before departure and an update upon arrival. Throughout the deployment, agents maintain contact with a wide range of host-nation contacts to monitor the ongoing threat. When the last aircraft departs, the mission is complete. "First in and last out" is not just a slogan, it is a way of life when protecting Air Force people is the goal. ♦


# Information Warfare



## Protecting the Chief's Network!

Lt. Col. Elia C. "Lee" Chambers  
AFPCA/DS DSN 227-7429

**T**wenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, we have the awesome challenge of leading the charge to protect network systems that are dedicated to supporting the secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force chief of staff. This is a battle where we engage our adversary moment-by-moment for a network enterprise that handles over 18,000 customer transactions a day! In addition to being a highly used system, the network attracts attention from interlopers or hackers throughout the world. Special Agent Jim Christy, chief, computer crime investigations and



information warfare, Air Force Office of Special Investigation, asserts that the Chief of Staff's network is the most highly targeted system in the Air Force. From a big picture perspective, Mr. Ken Van Wyk, then assessment team chief with the Defense Information Systems Agency, noted our network is the second most lucrative target to hackers—second only to systems supporting the president at *whitehouse.gov*.

On any given month, we experience over 1,500 unauthorized attempts to access our data. Many of our months are far from average—in

## Protect Your Data!

Here are some tips from the Office of Special Investigations computer crime investigations unit to help keep your computer files safe.

- ❑ Immediately report suspected hacker activity or virus problems to Air Force Information Warfare Center's Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team at 1-800-854-0187 and your local Air Force Office of Special Investigations detachment.
- ❑ Pick a password that combines random alphabetic and numeric characters, which use both upper and lower case letters. For example, "k%2Zt!9."
- ❑ Avoid passwords that can be found in the dictionary and don't use "Joe Passwords" like the last four of your social security account number or the names of your spouse, children, or pet.
- ❑ Change your password frequently.
- ❑ Never give your password to anyone. Never let anyone see you type in your password.
- ❑ Don't write the password on a sticky note and place it in your desk or underneath the keyboard.
- ❑ Always run virus protection software when using unknown diskettes in your machine or when downloading software off the Internet. ♦

one week, intruders from 35 locations throughout the globe were logging up to 500 attempts per day to penetrate our defenses. **Our success in keeping these intruders at bay is due to our *not* relying on a single silver bullet, such as a firewall, but an arsenal of weapons.**

Although we use three models to define and establish our overall network security posture, the mainstay of our program is our five-layered *protect strategy*:

**Security.** We established a hardened virtual outer barrier that provides a single access point

to the Internet. At this level, we rely on our network routers to enforce a three-tiered security policy:

1) Deny high-threat services to systems outside our domain. Here, the focus of our effort is to deny high-threat UNIX operating systems commands that would facilitate a hacker's access to our networks.

2) Deny access to high-threat locations. Our objective at this tier is to deny access to any system that has mounted an attack against our network.

**The investigator looked on as the autopsy continued and the forensics expert poked and prodded the insides of the body. He was attempting to discover some clue that would point to the person who could have done such a thing and the nature and extent of the crime. Finally, exhausted, he took a step back, and with a satisfied grin, said "we got him."**

This was not an autopsy of a human body but the highly sophisticated examination of a computer used to commit a crime. The computer hardware and software is examined by a computer forensics expert much like a pathologist doing an autopsy. Careful, extensive searching will almost always reveal the hard-to-find evidence in computer crimes.

Computer crime is escalating exponentially and is becoming a concern in the Air Force. Where once a crime investigation was fairly uncomplicated, now a computer can become central to a case involving rape, murder, child abuse, theft, or drug activity. Associated with this transformation is the need for highly trained investigators and noncrime scene investigations or forensics. In the past, a computer was either overlooked as an item

of interest or, due to a lack of awareness or understanding, ignored as evidence. To turn this around, AFOSI has begun to recruit and hire the best computer experts available out of the military academies and colleges, and in some cases from within the ranks of the Air Force itself.

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations is educating its investigators and returning students at increasingly detailed levels of computer crime awareness and instruction. Students receive a day of instruction in computer terminology, forensic capabilities, and unique evidence handling. There are also opportunities to return to the Air Force Academy to be trained for a week as a computer crime investigator augmentee. When they leave this course, they are capable of assisting the dozen or so AFOSI computer crime investigators worldwide. They are trained to seize special computer and media evidence, analyze encrypted or erased computer disks, retrieve lost or damaged files, or testify in highly technical trial proceedings.

The new laboratory is just another way in which the Air Force Office of Special Investigations is keeping up with the technologically astute criminal. It again proves that crime in the Air Force just doesn't pay. ♦



3) Dynamically adjust to the changing threat dimension. At this tier, flexibility is the key. We must configure our system to protect any new hack that intruders develop. In this case, we've programmed our routers to prevent spoofing attacks where hackers attempt to mislead our routers by imitating the identity of one of our network servers.

**Monitoring.** Yogi Berra once stated, "You can observe a lot by watching" which is exactly our purpose at this layer. Due to the customers using our systems, the criticality of the unclassified missions these systems support and the nature of the threat, we've decided we must provide a robust, 24-hour security monitoring capability. Using security monitoring tools we can isolate, analyze, and react to suspicious activity before it matures into an attack.

**Assessment.** At this layer, we attempt to establish a second protective shell—defense in depth—by hardening the systems internal to our domain. Although we can provide a good protective strategy by building a solid outer shell and monitoring our network, we cannot be effective without also venturing into our customer networks to assess their level of protection. Here, we periodically test the capability of our customer system administrators to appropriately configure their systems to withstand attacks from the Internet. During this phase, we actually conduct "no-notice" hacker attacks of their systems. After successfully hacking through their system, we assess password administration by attacking password files. Although our systems attempt to protect our passwords by encrypting them, there are excellent password crackers on the Internet—free for the asking—that can effectively break simple passwords. Our results are high for new systems coming under our purview. We recently completed an assessment for one of our new customers and we could break into 87 percent of their networks and crack 20 percent of their passwords!

**Training.** The fourth and most formidable

arrow in our protective quiver is training. After we make an assessment of our system administrator, we provide one-on-one training to show the system administrators the weaknesses we exploited and the steps necessary to harden their systems.

**Enforcement.** Our final step is enforcement. Believe it or not, even after breaking into a system and showing the system administrator what we are able to do, it is still not enough to ensure that the system administrator corrects the vulnerabilities that we identify. We must follow up because some system administrators never "get around to" correcting the vulnerabilities once we've pointed them out.

Again, no single solution or silver bullet, such as a firewall, will enable us to protect government systems from attack. A good comprehensive approach involving teamwork has been the solution for us. A breakdown in our domain routers' configuration, the system administrator's improper configuration of his host system, or a system user's weak password can increase the risk to the entire network. By bringing this team together, we've been able to turn a system that the office of special investigations once noted as not only the most targeted Air Force system—it was also the most penetrated Air Force system—to one the Defense Information System Agency noted was the best of 9,000 systems they had assessed in three years. I'm confident that a good, comprehensive approach can work for any commander who needs to protect their sensitive but unclassified data from access to the Internet! Believe me, if it will work in the Pentagon, it'll work any place. ♦

**Editor's note:** Lt. Col. Chambers is the director of security for the Pentagon Communications Agency and director of security for the single agency manager supporting the secretary of Defense, secretary of the Air Force, and the secretary of the Army.

# Tracking Recent Inspections

The following are the most recent Air Force Inspector General's Functional Management Review and Acquisition Management Review reports. The information in this section is general in nature and contains only the purpose and scope of the reviews. We do not include specific findings and/or recommendations because they are privileged information.

However, Air Force organizations may request a copy of these reports by calling Tech. Sgt. Widener at DSN 246-1645 or writing him at HQ AFIA/CVS; 9700 G Avenue SE, Suite 345D; Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670. Requests can also be made via E-mail using this Internet address: [tig@smtps.saia.af.mil](mailto:tig@smtps.saia.af.mil). Agencies outside the Air Force desiring a copy of any of these reports should contact SAF/IGI by dialing DSN 227-5119 or commercial (703) 697-5119.

**Acquisition Management Review of Provisioning Process, PN 96-501**, assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the provisioning process to provide timely support to fielded weapon systems. The team studied documentation obtained throughout the review and conducted interviews, primarily at Air Force Materiel Command product centers and air logistics centers. Other interviews were conducted with U.S. Air Force Headquarters, AFMC Headquarters, Air Force Audit Agency, Cataloging and Standardization Center, Joint Logistics Support Center, and using commands. (*HQ AFIA/AIP, Ms. Cynthia L. Sanders, DSN 246-1740*)

**Acquisition Management Review of Source Qualification and Approval Process for Air Logistics Center Procured Materiel, PN 96-502**, evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes by which sources are identified, qualified, and approved for supplying materiel to air logistics centers. Major areas reviewed were the effectiveness and efficiency of the air logistics center source qualification process and its supporting processes, impediments to those processes, and the corresponding process used by commercial firms. (*HQ AFIA/AIP, Ms. Cynthia L. Sanders, DSN 246-1740*)

matic issues of the C-5 aircraft engine high pressure turbine replacement. The team reviewed applicable policy and guidance covering modification management, explored the effects of acquisition reform on this acquisition category III program, and identified circumstantial concerns such as base closure and privatization at San Antonio Air Logistics Center. The team gathered pertinent documentation and interviewed key personnel within the propulsion, aircraft, contracting, and financial management directorates. (*HQ AFIA/AIP, Maj. Nancy L. Combs, DSN 246-1735*)

**Acquisition Management Review of C-5 Engine High Pressure Turbine Replacement, PN 96-503**, assessed planning efforts and program-

**Functional Management Review of Quality of Contract Aircraft Maintenance, PN 96-603**, assessed the quality and effectiveness of contract aircraft

maintenance performed on U.S. Air Force aircraft. The team reviewed Air Force and multi-command regulation policy and guidance for adequacy; assessed the Air Force's ability to ensure contractor compliance with multi-command regulations, 00-20-series technical orders, and procedures; and determined the Air Force's ability to ensure the contractor safely and reliably met operational commitments. (HQ AFIA/MIL, Lt. Col. Christopher C. Grady, DSN 246-2082)

**Functional Management Review of Information Management Readiness, PN 96-605**, assessed the effectiveness of wartime readiness training for information management flights and information management staff support personnel and assessed information management guidance in base support and operations plans. The team reviewed U.S. Air Force, major command, and air component staff policy and guidance; selected base operations plans, information management annexes, exercise

scenarios, and implementation of force sizing exercise/base-level assessment 1995 guidance at major command and base level; training records; and use of Air Force Form 209, *Information Management Operations After-Action Report*. (HQ AFIA/MIS, Maj. Alvin T. Odom, DSN 246-2203)

**Functional Management Review of Hazardous Material Pharmacy Operations, PN 96-606**, evaluated the organizational and operational effectiveness of hazardous material pharmacies, their ability to effectively minimize hazardous waste, protect the health of our work force, and provide timely mission support. The team evaluated policy and guidance on hazardous material pharmacy operations, base-level training programs, reviewed manning and organizational structure, and operational procedures and adequacy of processes used for receiving, storing, and issuing hazardous material. (HQ AFIA/MIL, Maj. Anne T. Houseal, DSN 246-2051)

### **Functional Management Review of Vehicle Parts Acquisition, PN 95-624**,

reviewed the Air Force's base-level vehicle parts acquisition process to assess the potential for increased efficiencies and determine the effectiveness of meeting customer's expectations and requirements. The team reviewed base-level transportation vehicle parts acquisition processes; facilitated flow charting of local parts acquisition process by unit personnel; reviewed major commands' vehicle parts acquisition guidance; interviewed customers to determine if expectations were being met; and analyzed results to determine constraints, redundancies, and efficiencies. (HQ AFIA/MIL, Maj. Melissa A. Higginbotham, DSN 246-2052)◆

# Summary of Recent Audits

**Ms. Terri Buckholtz**  
AFAA/DOO DSN 426-8012

The Air Force Audit Agency provides professional and independent internal audit service to all levels of Air Force management. The reports summarized here discuss ways to improve the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency of installation-level operations and, therefore, may be useful to you. Air Force officials may request copies of these reports or a listing of recently published reports by contacting Ms. Terri Buckholtz at the number above, E-mailing to [reports@afaa.hq.af.mil](mailto:reports@afaa.hq.af.mil), or writing to HQ AFAA/DOO, 1125 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1125.

**Management of F-16 Aircraft Flying Operations and Training** at a Pacific Air Forces installation needed improvement. The flying hour program manager did not update the final fiscal year program budget request for changes in pilot authorizations and did not review changes in pilot availability. In addition, squadron flight schedulers did not schedule beyond the current week and allow for advance flight

scheduling flexibility. Furthermore, operations schedulers did not retain or receive cross country mission approval documents. The installation could put approximately \$3 million to better use annually by updating and correcting the flying hour program budget request and reassigning additional pilot duties. (*Report of Audit 93496027*)

**Management of Blueprints** at an Air Education and Training Command installation was not effectively managed. Specifically, civil engineering personnel did not update blueprints, the base comprehensive plan, and facility drawings as required. In addition, project managers did not provide contractors with complete and accurate blueprints, resulting in differing site conditions. As a result, contract modifications were necessary in four contracts reviewed because blueprints were not complete and accurate, costing the Air Force approximately \$140,000 in work stoppage payments and redesign costs. With over \$400 million in improvements planned for this installation over the next eight years, it is critical that current blueprints with accurate site data are available to Air Force managers and contractors. (*Report of Audit 92596094*)

**Management of Fiber Optics** at an Air National Guard base required improvement. Fiber optic-related equipment was not always properly calibrated,

accounted for, or labeled. Specifically, the equipment custodian did not always send fiber optic test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment to the precision measurement equipment laboratory for calibration or a calibration determination. Additionally, the fiber optic equipment custodian did not maintain utilization data for fiber optic-related equipment and did not promptly turn in excess equipment. Maintaining utilization data aids management in making important and expensive acquisition decisions. (*Report of Audit 24696019*)

**Management of Red Horse Flight Equipment, Supplies, and Tools** at a United States Air Forces in Europe installation needed improvement. Specifically, Red Horse flight personnel did not maintain proper accountability for deployable equipment items. Additionally, flight personnel did not properly maintain equipment and supply item authorization allowances or mission requirements. Furthermore, flight personnel did not provide adequate physical security for the equipment, supplies, and tools valued at over \$9 million. Proper accountability and adequate physical security are key internal controls to prevent theft or loss of government assets and to detect missing items. (*Report of Audit 52296062*) ♦



# It's an Oversight!

## The Acquisition Oversight Coordination Board

**Maj Laurie Gozzo**  
HQ AFIA/AIS DSN 246-0288

**T**he Acquisition Oversight Coordination Board was established in 1991 by then Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice to address concerns with the increasing burden placed on program offices caused by the vast number of independent reviews and inspections. The AOCB is co-chaired by the Air Force Inspection Agency, the Air Force Audit Agency, and the Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command Inspectors General.

The secretary of the Air Force chartered the AOCB to:

- 1) Determine the oversight requirements of greatest importance to the acquisition community.
- 2) Integrate annual plans for reviews, inspections, and audits.
- 3) Capitalize on the strengths of each oversight agency while reducing the aggregate burden on acquisition workers.

The AOCB accomplishes these objectives by conducting annual joint topic calls, validating the appropriateness of topics, and coordinating with other government agencies.

The AOCB issues an annual

call for topics each January. All topics submitted are considered for the following fiscal year's review cycle. The letter, asking for proposed topics from the Air Force acquisition community, is sent to senior acquisition leaders including AFMC center commanders, HQ AFMC directors, single managers, Air Force Program executive officers, and Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition directorate chiefs. If you have a topic you would like included in the next annual topic call, contact the appropriate office in your chain of command. If you are unable to locate that office, then call one of the agency points of contact listed at the end of this article.

The AOCB validates and de-conflicts topics by checking if they have been recently reviewed or are planned for review by an Air Force or other government oversight agency such as the General Accounting Office, Department of Defense Inspector General, Defense Logistics Agency, or the Defense Contract Audit Agency. The members also analyze the proposed topics to determine if the scope is within the members' capabilities.

After validating the proposed topics, the AOCB assigns each

topic to one of the co-chairs based on their agency's mission. The cochairs include the topics in their annual plans and the AOCB annual plan. To assemble the best team, the AOCB members will sometimes augment each other's review or audit teams. In October, the AOCB publishes the resultant annual plan. As the review year progresses, the co-chairs continue de-confliction through quarterly meetings and phone calls.

The AOCB coordinates its proposed topics with other government oversight agencies. If another agency plans a similar review, the AOCB may cancel or defer its planned review. If deferred, the AOCB member will later review only areas not addressed by the other agency.

You may obtain additional information about the AOCB at the HQ AFMC/IG Home Page at [www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/organizations/HQ-AFMC/IG](http://www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/organizations/HQ-AFMC/IG), or you may call one of the following points of contact:

HQ AFMA/QLQ: Mr. Gary Borovitcky, DSN 787-5433; Commercial 513-257-5433

HQ AFIA/AIS: Ms. Cynthia Sanders, DSN 246-5689; Commercial 505-846-5689

HQ AFMC/IGIP: Mr. Tony Peasant, DSN 787-7628; Commercial 513-257-7628♦



# COURT-MARTIALED!

## Administrative Procedures

Mr. Charles Fisher  
HQ AFSPA/SPC DSN 263-0040  
Ms. Gloria J. Solis  
HQ AFSPA/SPCI DSN 263-0072

While the Air Force does everything in its power to maintain good order and discipline among its members, the end to some military careers does go by way of a court-martial. During calendar year 1995, the Air Force court-martialed 959 of its members. Many supervisors and commanders are often unfamiliar with required administrative procedures once a court-martial has taken place because courts-martial are more the exception than the rule. The following information may prove helpful if you have the disagreeable task of ensuring all administrative details are properly handled for a court-martialed member.

When a member is first placed in confinement, change the member's duty status by completing an Air Force Form 2098, *Duty Status Change*. Pretrial confinement is duty

status code 16 while confinement following a court-martial is duty status code 17. Process the form through your local military personnel flight and accounting and finance office. This form will initiate finance actions under the new duty status but the unit should verify with the finance office that entitlements are adjusted for the new status. With approval of the fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense Authorization Act effective April 1, 1996, there are changes which affect the pay status of members sentenced to confinement. In effect, the act provides for automatic administrative forfeiture of pay and allowances, total forfeiture for a general court-martial and two-thirds of pay for a special court-martial, when a sentence exceeds six months confinement or less than six months but includes a dishonorable, bad conduct discharge, or dismissal. Upon release from confinement, the automatic forfeitures terminate and forfeitures revert to those adjudged and remaining, if any. Upon application by a convicted member, the convening authority may defer automatic forfeitures until he or she

approves the sentence, a process that may take months. In addition, the convening authority may waive any or all of the forfeitures affected by the automatic forfeitures of pay and allowances in cases involving an accused who has dependents. The waiver cannot exceed six months and the money must be paid to the member's dependents. Further information may be obtained through your base legal office or the finance office.

The unit is responsible for counseling the court-martialed member regarding shipment of household goods. Neither personal property nor household goods will accompany a member sentenced to confinement to the gaining facility. Members with dependents may apply for household goods relocation according to Air Force Instruction 24-101, *Passenger Movement*, and Joint Travel Regulations U5370-J. There is no entitlement for single or divorced members without dependents to ship or store household goods and personal property at government expense in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations U5317. Members sentenced to confinement from an overseas location may ship household goods to their home of record or designated place according

to Joint Travel Regulations U5370, paragraph D8.

Units should confiscate identification cards of members sentenced to confinement and of their dependents. The parent unit issues the dependents new cards in 364-day increments according to Air Force Instruction 36-3001, *Issuing and Controlling Identification Cards*, and dependents may maintain their entitlement in Dependent Eligibility Enrollment Registration System. The member does not receive an identification card while in confinement but his or her dependents maintain their status until the final court-martial order is published. If the member is released from confinement and placed on appellate leave or parole before the final court-martial order is published, he or she receives an identification card in 364-day increments. The final court-martial order may indicate a discharge or dismissal will be executed.

Normally, the parent unit will receive a message from Headquarters Air Force Security Police Agency, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico regarding transfer of the member within the military confinement system by either permanent change of station or permanent change of station without permanent change of assignment. Once the convening authority publishes the court-martial order, AFSPA will send a second message asking the unit to amend the permanent change of station without permanent change of assignment orders to read

“permanent change of station with permanent change of assignment.” AFSPA provides the assignment action number for the permanent change of station orders in the message to the unit for the change to be made.

When AFSPA receives the court-martial order, the parent unit will be sent a message requesting the unit personnel record group, amended orders reading “permanent change of station with permanent change of assignment,” the Air Force Form 2098 changing the member’s status from present for duty to confinement, the unfavorable information file, and a current report on individual person. If a member in confinement is transferred from local confinement at the base where he or she is court-martialed to a Department of Defense regional confinement facility, the health and dental records are forwarded to the facility where the member is confined.

If a member has 20 creditable years of service prior to confinement, he or she may be allowed to submit an Air Force Form 1160, *Military Retirement Actions*, requesting retirement in lieu of a court-martial. Such applications must be submitted through proper channels and require appropriate approvals and time lines. If a member is assigned to AFSPA, forward the form to AFSPA for processing.

If the convicted member is still assigned to your unit when he or she goes on appellate leave status and is released from confinement awaiting

final court-martial order, prepare Air Force Form 988, *Leave Request/Authorization*, and process it through the local military personnel flight and accounting and finance office.

If the convicted member is still assigned to your unit when he or she receives the final court-martial order indicating legal reviews are completed, prepare the discharge as authorized and furnish copies of the Defense Department Form 214, *Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty*, and Air Force Form 100, *Request and Authorization for Separation*. If the member is assigned to AFSPA at the time the final general court-martial order is received, AFSPA will prepare the discharge.

If a question arises concerning procedures for convicted members, your local legal office or AFSPA, directorate of corrections, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, may assist you. Air Force Instruction 31-205, *Corrections Program*, is available at all Air Force base installations. After reviewing this instruction and seeking advice from the legal office, you will have a better understanding of the court-martial and confinement process and will ensure the member’s status is documented properly. While being the supervisor of a court-martialed member is not a pleasant experience, it is one you may have to face in the future. Knowing the proper administrative procedures can save time and frustration for commanders, supervisors, and members as well. ♦



# Sexual Harassment in the Workplace

Major Lesa Carter  
AFLSA/JACL DSN 426-9150

From the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings to the Navy's Tailhook scandal, the nation is now sensitized to the sexual harassment issue. Never before has the issue been given so much attention nor have so many incidents been reported. As more are reported, investigated, and even make it to court, more employers are stepping up their efforts to fight sexual harassment in the workplace.

The Air Force is no exception. In announcing a zero-tolerance policy for discrimination and sexual harassment, the Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Sheila E. Widnall and the Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman recognized the need to provide employees with a workplace free from unnecessary stressors and interpersonal problems. Their joint letter of Feb. 28, 1995, stated, "Every Air Force member deserves the opportu-

nity to achieve his or her own potential, and to work and live in an environment that values human dignity and is free of discrimination."

Air Force employees, supervisors, and subordinates need to be aware of what constitutes sexual harassment, how to prevent it, and when to take action to correct it.

Air Force Instruction 36-2701, *Social Actions Programs*, Attachment 1, dated Aug. 25, 1994, defines sexual harassment as any of the following:

- Making submission to sexually based conduct either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of the job

- Using submission to sexually based conduct as a basis for decisions affecting one's career or employment

- Sexually based conduct interfering with duty performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment

- Supervisory personnel

using or condoning the use of either explicit or implicit sexually based behavior to control, influence, or affect one's pay, career, or job

- Making deliberate or repeated verbal comments, gestures, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.

Sexual harassment is categorized in one of two ways: *quid pro quo* sexual harassment and hostile work environment. What the courts call *quid pro quo* harassment is what the public readily recognizes as illegal harassment—trading work benefits in exchange for sexual favors. In other words, "Go to bed with me and I'll see that you get that promotion." Hostile environment sexual harassment is less obvious. It may consist of lewd jokes, offensive comments, inappropriately touching employees, displaying pinup calendars or other sexually explicit material, or any other behavior of a sexual nature that is intended or



found to be offensive.

Any Air Force employee—military, civilian, male, female, supervisor, or subordinate—may be found to have sexually harassed another. Legally, the Air Force can be held liable for sexual harassment by supervisors and co-workers depending on the circumstances. If one co-worker sexually harasses another and management learns of the harassment and fails to take action, the Air Force will be held responsible for that misconduct. The Air Force may be held liable for conduct of supervisors towards subordinates even if the behavior is not sanctioned in any way by management. Additionally, a supervisor could be held personally liable in civil court for his action or inaction, if found to be acting outside the scope of his or her employment.

Military members as well as civilians can be disciplined for sexual harassment. The type of discipline will depend on the severity of the misconduct. Courts have sustained discipline, including removal of civilians for sexual harassment. Military members have been court-martialed for sexual harassment.

Both military members and civilians also can be victims of harassment and each type of employee has a remedy under the law. Military members may

complain to their supervisors, the inspector general, or social actions. Civilians may complain to supervisors, the inspector general, or the base equal employment opportunity office. They can raise claims of sexual harassment in appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and in many cases, through their collective bargaining agreement or the agency grievance process.

Claims by civilian employees may eventually find their way to federal court, where the employee is entitled to a jury trial. If the Air Force has sexually harassed the employee, he or she is entitled to have any adverse personnel action corrected. This can entitle the employee to reinstatement or promotion with an award of backpay. A prevailing employee can also get attorney's fees, costs of the litigation, and thousands of dollars in compensatory damages.

The costs of sexual harassment cannot be measured in dollars alone. Sexual harassment can be devastating to the victim and can result in a loss of job productivity, personal anguish, a loss of personal dignity, and even physical or mental disability. Additionally, the intangible costs to the agency can be tremendous because sexual harassment has

a serious negative impact on the public's perception of the agency. Sexual harassment also disrupts an organization through lowered employee morale and productivity, increased employee turnover, and damaged recruitment.

The dollar costs of sexual harassment can also be staggering. In one recent class-action claim, which was dismissed, the Air Force faced a potential liability of \$1.4 million in compensatory damages.

At base level, administrative claims of discrimination, usually processed through equal employment opportunity channels can be quite costly. Administrative judges may recommend findings of discrimination, thousands of dollars in compensatory damages, plus attorney fees. Base legal offices frequently settle cases which may involve payment of damage awards as well as attorney fees. At the administrative stage, all of these amounts are paid out of the base operations and maintenance funds. If the matter reaches the civil court system, settlements and judgments are paid from the "judgment fund," a federally appropriated source of money.

Many Air Force resources are dedicated to the full-time prevention and combating of discrimination. At base level,

social actions and the equal employment opportunity offices are responsible for the first inquiries into the claims. Civilian personnel offices also have full-time specialists dedicated to the process. Base legal offices have at least one attorney who serves as an advisor to each of these agencies. Finally, in Washington, D.C., the central labor law office, comprised of 10 attorneys, assists base legal offices in all areas of labor law practice and the civilian personnel branch of general litigation, also comprised of 10 attorneys, defends the Air Force in federal court in all discrimination cases.

Fortunately, the Air Force has not been overwhelmed with sexual harassment cases. Of the 135 cases of discrimination currently pending in federal courts across the country, sexual harassment allegations make up only 12 of the suits. Since 1994, two sexual harassment cases have gone to trial with verdicts both in favor of the Air Force. Two cases have been settled out of court for minimal dollar amounts and many others have been dismissed on various legal grounds. While these favorable numbers are reflective of the Air Force's proactive approach to combating sexual harassment, they do not mean that sexual harassment has been

eliminated. Eliminating sexual harassment requires constant and continuing work.

Supervisors and managers need to be aware of their employees' conduct and take prompt action when they fail to exhibit proper workplace behavior. Shirking responsibility by ignoring improper behavior or tolerating it simply because no one complains will cost the unit in the long run. When faced with a complaint of sexual harassment, supervisors must be sensitive and responsive and take each allegation seriously. Supervisors must contact legal offices and civilian personnel offices for advice when confronted with sexual harassment. The role of the judge advocate is crucial in these cases. Attorneys can advise on the proper handling of cases, whether the conduct does amount to sexual harassment, and what, if any, corrective action should be taken.

Additionally, every Air Force employee, whether a supervisor or co-worker, needs to be aware of his or her own conduct. It

is quite possible to behave in a way that is friendly and personable without offending workers of either gender. When evaluating whether a comment or action would be appropriate in the workplace, consider if you would say or do it in front of your spouse or parents, a colleague of the same sex or how would you feel if your spouse, parent, sibling, or child were subjected to the same comment or behavior. Ask yourself how you would feel if the opposite sex said the same things to you or if it needs to be said or done at all.

Combating sexual harassment is everyone's business. Creating a workplace free from harassment is the right thing to do for the Air Force, the unit, and each person in the unit. A workplace free from harassment is a workplace where morale can be high and productivity can skyrocket. ♦



# Age-Specific Considerations in Patient Care

Col. Frankie G. Smith  
HQ AFIA/SGM DSN 246-2510

This often misunderstood concept has been a challenge for medical treatment facilities to address, demonstrate, and comply. Each patient, therefore, has a right to have their

age considered in their plan, execution, and follow-up of care.

As a facility-wide issue, there can be two approaches to satisfy this requirement. First, individual flights, departments, and sections should review their policies, procedures, safety practices, unit-specific orientation, training programs, and job descriptions to incorporate age-specific considerations of their patient population. Second, overlapping policies and procedures should be approached in a collaborative effort by medical, nursing, dental, surgical, ancillary services, group education, facility management personnel, and others as needed or determined by the facility. The objectives should include the following:

- 1) Define the common specific age populations served, whether neonatal, pediatric, adolescent, or geriatric, and ensure unique needs of these patients are considered in policy development and plans for the delivery of care.

- 2) Ensure that organization plans for the safety and security of patient care environment includes

age-specific considerations of the population served.

- 3) Ensure that age ranges cared for are included in job descriptions which will be the basis of age-specific considerations for facility orientation and local training programs.

A major benefit to this approach is the development of a uniform level of care for all areas addressed.

Health services inspections over the past year have revealed facilities are at various stages of compliance of the standards noted in demonstrating age-specific considerations. Of the facilities within compliance, there were multiple examples of neonatal and pediatric considerations. For the most part, there was little consideration given to adolescent or geriatric patients. The most successful facilities had developed multiple process improvement teams that enhanced the understanding and interface between departments and services regarding age-specific considerations. Areas the teams addressed included describing preanesthesia assessment and planning requirements, medication administration and pain control, nutritional needs, aeromedical evacuation guidance, appointment considerations, diabetic education, and invasive procedures.

A well-planned approach and implementation of sound guidelines will result in smoother patient flow, improved patient satisfaction, enhanced staff education and appreciation of other disciplines, while ensuring age groups are treated according to their unique needs. ♦

**T**he Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has standards that address age-specific requirements for patient care. Two separate standards, HR.5 and standard TX.1, make the intent of the commission clear. Standard HR.5 in the 1996 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for Hospitals states "...the hospital considers special needs and behaviors of specific age groups in defining the qualifications, duties, and responsibilities of staff who do not have clinical privileges but who do have regular clinical contact with patients." This refers specifically to radiology technologists and mental health technicians. The manual states further that "competency assessments of such individuals clearly address the ages of the patients they serve..." Standard TX.1 also states that "care is planned to respond to each patient's unique needs including age-specific needs, expectations, and characteristics with effective, efficient, and individualized care."

U.S. Air Force Photo

# a call for manuscripts

Manuscripts submitted to *TIG Brief* should appeal to our primary readership: Air Force commanders, leaders at every level, inspectors, and inspectors generals world-wide. When submitting a manuscript, the following is offered as a guide:

- ✓ As magazine space is limited, condense articles to around 400 but no more than 800 words. This is usually two and one-half to five typewritten, double-spaced pages.

- ✓ While personal experience is the best teacher, try to apply what you may have learned to the broader Air Force audience. How can other units adapt what you've done?

- ✓ Use conversational tone and attention-getting style. Avoid overly technical information unless needed for clarification.

- ✓ State the problems, recommended solutions, and results if applicable.

- ✓ Before submitting your manuscripts, be sure to receive approval through your chain of command.

- ✓ Send your manuscripts electronically to [tig@smtps.afia.af.mil](mailto:tig@smtps.afia.af.mil) or on a 3.5-inch disk to:

HQ AFIA/CVC  
*TIG Brief* Magazine  
9700 G Ave SE, Suite #320F  
Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670

Be sure and include your name, office symbol, and defense switch network telephone number.